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NOTE
WHEN IT COMES TO PRIVILEGE, YOU’RE BETTER
OFF DEAD: PROTECTING ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
COMMUNICATIONS SENT THROUGH PRISON
EMAIL SYSTEMS
Christopher J. Milazzo*
Some federal prosecutors are reading emails sent between inmates 
and their attorneys.  The federal prison email system, called TRULINCS, 
requires inmates to acknowledge that their emails are monitored and 
thereby not covered by attorney-client privilege.  In the past, prosecutors 
used “privilege teams” to sort ostensibly privileged emails from un-
privileged emails, but some prosecutors have stopped that practice.  This 
Note argues that emails sent through TRULINCS could still be protected 
under the doctrine of selective waiver, which has been raised in securities 
litigation to no effect.  This Note suggests that the rationale of attorney-
client privilege—encouraging full and frank communication between at-
torneys and their clients—is best served by the application of selective 
waiver to emails sent through TRULINCS.  This Note also explains that 
the rationales courts offer against selective waiver are not at play in the 
context of prison emails.
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INTRODUCTION
Dr. Syed Imran Ahmed’s attorneys had a problem: They could not
email their client.1  Dr. Ahmed, a surgeon accused of Medicare fraud,
was being held at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New
York.2  Dr. Ahmed’s case had generated “50,000 pages of documents so
far, including ‘Medicare claim data and patient information.’”3  The data
and information was at the heart of Dr. Ahmed’s case, and his attorneys
could not understand it without the doctor’s assistance.4
In court documents filed in the Eastern District of New York
(E.D.N.Y.), Morris J. Fodeman—one of Dr. Ahmed’s attorneys acting as
a public defender at a $125 hourly rate—stated that an in-person visit to
his client took around five hours, including travel time to the prison and
wait time at the prison while jail personnel retrieved Dr. Ahmed.5  Al-
though it was technically possible to set up unmonitored phone calls with
his client, Fodeman stated, “a paralegal spent four days and left eight
messages requesting such a call and got nowhere.”6  Given the time and
expense associated with in-person meetings and the effective impossibil-
ity of arranging unmonitored phone calls, Fodeman wanted to email Dr.
1 Stephanie Clifford, Prosecutors Are Reading Emails from Inmates to Lawyers, N.Y.
TIMES (July 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/nyregion/us-is-reading-inmates-
email-sent-to-lawyers.html?_r=0.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
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Ahmed—and had done so before—so that Dr. Ahmed could respond eas-
ily to questions as they arose.7
But the prosecution team was reading their emails.8
Attorney-client privilege, the prosecutors argued, did not apply here
because Dr. Ahmed waived the privilege by using the prison email sys-
tem, the Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS).9
To use the system, each inmate must read and accept a notice that all
emails sent through TRULINCS are monitored by prison administra-
tors.10  As such, Dr. Ahmed had no reasonable expectation of privacy
when emailing his attorneys.11  While in the past prosecutors used a
“privilege team” to sort privileged emails from non-privileged emails,
budget cuts had forced prosecutors to shut down the team.12  Sorting out
privileged emails would be too high of an administrative burden, prose-
cutors argued.13
While the judge in Dr. Ahmed’s case, the Hon. Dora L. Irizarry,
U.S.D.J., did not take kindly to the prosecution’s arguments,14 courts’
responses to similar situations have been mixed.  For example, another
judge in the E.D.N.Y. ruled that prosecutors could read TRULINCS
communications sent between attorneys and their clients.15  In that case,
the defense argued that the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) refusal to provide
“a privileged form of email communication” infringed their client’s right
to effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment.16  However, the judge
ruled that “by implementing TRULINCS in recent years, BOP has not
placed restrictions on inmates’ ability to contact their counsel, but rather
it has significantly increased inmates’ ability to communicate with the
outside world, including with their counsel, even if not currently in a
privileged form.”17
This Note will argue that emails sent between attorneys and their
clients through the TRULINCS system could be protected under the doc-
trine of selective waiver.  Part I will overview the role of attorney-client
privilege in prison communication between clients and their attorneys.
7 Id.
8 See id.
9 See id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See id. (“‘That’s hogwash,’ Judge Irizarry said.  ‘You’re going to tell me you don’t
want to know what your adversary’s strategy is?  What kind of a litigator are you then?  Give
me a break.’”).
15 See United States v. Asaro, No. 14-CR-26 (ARR), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97396, at
*4–5 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2014).
16 Id. at *3.
17 Id. at *4.
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Part II will explain the selective waiver doctrine, its rejection by most
courts in the securities litigation context, and its applicability to TRU-
LINCS communications.
Part II.A.1 argues that courts decline to apply selective waiver in the
securities litigation context for three primary reasons.  First, selective
waiver does not encourage full and frank communication between attor-
neys and their clients.  Second, selective waiver obstructs the fact-finding
process beyond the scope envisioned by the attorney-client privilege.  Fi-
nally, selective waiver, at least in the securities context, is not supported
by a sufficiently important public interest.
In Part II.A.2, this Note will demonstrate that a federal inmate could
viably raise selective waiver in certain circumstances.  Part II.A.2 argues
that application of selective waiver can encourage full and frank commu-
nication between attorneys and their clients, not unduly obstruct the fact-
finding process, and supports the public’s interest in effective legal rep-
resentation.  Part II.B argues that federal prosecutors cannot overcome
the attorney-client privilege through the assertion of administrative bur-
den.  Finally, this Note will conclude by considering some practical
questions about selective waiver’s application.
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND PRISON COMMUNICATION
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege
1. Rationales for the Attorney-Client Privilege
In federal court, common law defines the scope and application of
the attorney-client privilege.18  Generally, the attorney-client privilege
protects communications made in confidence between privileged persons
“for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the
client.”19
In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court provided a con-
cise and frequently quoted rationale for the attorney-client privilege.20
The Court stated, “[The] purpose [of the attorney-client privilege] is to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their cli-
ents and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice.”21  The Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers (the Restatement) outlines “three related as-
sumptions” that together justify the Court’s statement.22
18 FED. R. EVID. 501. For purposes of this Note, I will focus on federal law.
19 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
20 See 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
21 Id.
22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c.
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First, “vindicating rights and complying with” legal obligations are
“matters often too complex” for lay clients, which is why they consult
lawyers.23  Second, attorney-client relationships can present information
asymmetry problems without “frank and full discussion.”24  Lawyers are
better suited to determine relevant facts and how legal rules will apply to
those facts.25  As such, lawyers need clients to disclose all of the facts so
that lawyers can render effective legal assistance.26  Third, “clients
would be unwilling to disclose personal, embarrassing, or unpleasant
facts unless they could be assured that neither they nor their lawyers
could be called later to testify to the communication.”27
The rationale provided by the Upjohn Court and the Restatement’s
related assumptions underscore the idea that public interests drive the
application of the attorney-client privilege.28  For example, courts fre-
quently hold that the attorney-client privilege survives the death of a law-
yer’s client.29  As explained by the Court in Swidler & Berlin v. United
States, clients may be hesitant to share damaging or incriminating infor-
mation with their attorneys if it could be revealed after their deaths: “Cli-
ents may be concerned about reputation, civil liability, or possible harm
to friends or family.  Posthumous disclosure of such communications
may be as feared as disclosure during the client’s lifetime.”30
However, public interests can also curtail the application of the at-
torney-client privilege.31  Privileges are “strictly construed and accepted”
to the extent that the public’s interest in concealing evidence outweighs
“the fundamental principle that ‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s
evidence.’”32  Hence, married couples cannot invoke the marital privi-
lege to prevent their partners from offering testimony against them.33
Archaic notions of familial peace and spousal subjugation were once of-
fered as justifications for such a rule, but those purported justifications
23 Id.
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 Id.
28 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996).
29 See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998) (“It has been gener-
ally, if not universally, accepted, for well over a century, that the attorney-client privilege
survives the death of the client in [a criminal proceeding where the deceased may have infor-
mation relevant to the prosecution’s investigation]. While the arguments against the survival of
the privilege are by no means frivolous, they are based in large part on speculation—thought-
ful speculation, but speculation nonetheless—as to whether posthumous termination of the
privilege would diminish a client’s willingness to confide in an attorney.”).
30 Id. at 407; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 77
(AM. LAW INST. 2000).
31 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50–51 (1980).
32 See id. at 50 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
33 See id. at 52–53.
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are simply wrong.34  Similarly, clients cannot invoke the attorney-client
privilege to prevent the disclosure of attorney-client communications
when clients “consult[ ] a lawyer for the purpose, later accomplished, of
obtaining assistance to engage in a crime or fraud or aiding a third person
to do so.”35  This “crime-fraud exception” is justified on the grounds that
clients may not seek protection of the law while abusing the law.36
2. Scope and Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege does not have a fixed expression.37
Courts apply or decline to apply the privilege on a case-by-case basis,
with an eye towards competing interests: the need for effective represen-
tation and the effective administration of justice.38  Making matters more
complicated, the duration of the attorney-client privilege may be perpet-
ual.39  As such, identifying the scope of the attorney-client privilege in
the abstract is difficult.  It is perhaps easier to say when the attorney-
client privilege does not apply.  Notably for our purposes, the attorney-
client privilege is waived when “the client, the client’s lawyer, or another
authorized agent . . . voluntarily discloses the communication in a non-
privileged communication.”40  This waiver generally extends to commu-
nications relating to the same subject matter as that which was
voluntarily revealed.41  Hence, one would argue that a prisoner waives
the attorney-client privilege with respect to communications about sub-
ject matter x when he voluntarily sends a TRULINCS communication
relating to subject matter x.
34 See id. at 52 (“Nowhere in the common-law world—indeed in any modern society—is
a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity
associated with recognition as a whole human being. . . . [Moreover, w]hen one spouse is
willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding—whatever the motivation—their
relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital har-
mony for the privilege to preserve.”).
35 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82(a).
36 See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 cmt. b (“When a client consults a lawyer intending to violate ele-
mental legal obligations, there is less social interest in protecting the communication.  Correla-
tively, there is a public interest in preventing clients from attempting to misuse the client-
lawyer relationship for seriously harmful ends.”).
37 See Univ. of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (discussing the Court’s discre-
tion to “develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis” and application of that discretion
where Congress has expressed a position on a particular type of privilege).
38 See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389–90 (1981).
39 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 77.
40 Id. § 79.
41 See id. cmt. f.
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B. Attorney-Client Privilege and TRULINCS
1. Forms of Prison Communication
Federal prisoners have several means of communication.  In addi-
tion to email, discussed below, prisoners can meet with visitors in per-
son, use the telephone, and correspond through traditional mail.42  Each
prison governs a prisoner’s visitation rights.43  For telephone calls, pris-
oners are generally allotted 300 minutes per calendar month, or 10 min-
utes a day.44  Prison officials monitor every call.45  Prisoners may set up
unmonitored legal phone calls, which do not count against prisoners’
300-minute allotment.46  Once established, “[prison s]taff may not moni-
tor an inmate’s properly placed call to an attorney.”47  However, un-
monitored calls are subject to the procedures of individual prisons.48
Typically, prisoners must demonstrate that other means of communica-
tion are inadequate to communicate with their attorneys.49  This showing
is made in light of the Bureau’s presumption that “[f]requent un-
monitored telephone calls increase an inmate’s opportunity to pursue il-
legal activities without detection, and require an inordinate amount of
staff time.”50
Regarding traditional correspondence, prison staff designates each
piece of mail as either “general” or “special” mail.51  General mail is
“incoming or outgoing correspondence other than special mail.”52  Spe-
cial mail includes, inter alia, correspondence sent between prisoners and
their attorneys.53  Prison staff open and inspect general mail for contra-
band and “content which might threaten the security or good order of the
institution.”54  Special mail is screened for physical contraband in the
receiving inmate’s presence.55  Additionally, prison staff do not read spe-
cial mail “if the sender is adequately identified on the envelope, and the
front of the envelope is marked ‘Special Mail—Open only in the pres-
42 See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 31–32 (2014) [hereinafter BOP GUIDE].
43 See id. at 31.
44 Id.
45 See id. at 32.
46 See id. at 34–35.
47 28 C.F.R. § 540.102 (2008).
48 See id.
49 See BOP GUIDE, supra note 42, at 35. R
50 Id.
51 See id. at 32.
52 28 C.F.R. § 540.2(a) (2014).
53 Id. § 540.2(c).
54 BOP GUIDE, supra note 42, at 32. R
55 28 C.F.R. § 540.18(a).
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ence of the inmate.’”56  In this way, special mail preserves the confiden-
tiality of properly marked attorney-client communications.57
2. The TRULINCS Email System
The Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS) is
used to “send electronic messages . . . securely, efficiently, and economi-
cally.”58  According to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), TRULINCS is a
privilege, revocable by each prison’s warden.59  However, each prisoner
pays a fee for the privilege to use the TRULINCS system.60
According to the BOP, the objectives of TRULINCS are:
• To provide inmates with an alternative means of writ-
ten communication with the public.
• To provide the Bureau [of Prisons] with a more effi-
cient, cost-effective, and secure method of managing
and monitoring inmate communication services.
• To reduce the opportunities for illegal drugs or con-
traband to be introduced into Bureau facilities
through inmate mail.61
To use the system, each prisoner maintains a TRULINCS contacts list,
which lists persons outside the prison that the prisoner can exchange
emails with.62  Prison staff monitors all messages exchanged through
TRULINCS.63  Before using the TRULINCS system, each prisoner must
read and accept a notice that states prisoners “voluntarily consent to hav-
ing all incoming and outgoing electronic messages, including transac-
tional data, message contents, and other activities, monitored and
retained by Bureau staff.”64  Although prisoners may add special mail
recipients, such as their attorneys, to their TRULINCS contacts list, elec-
tronic messages sent to and from their attorneys do not receive special
mail procedures.65  As such, attorney-client communications purportedly
56 Id.
57 See Henthorn v. Swinson, 955 F.2d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 1992); see also BOP GUIDE,
supra note 42, at 34 (stating that “[p]articular care is taken to ensure that ‘special mail’ (mail R
to or from courts, attorneys, and certain government officials) is kept confidential”).
58 FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , TRUST FUND LIMITED INMATE
COMPUTER SYSTEM (TRULINCS)—ELECTRONIC MESSAGING 1 (2009) [hereinafter
TRULINCS].
59 Id. at 2.
60 Id. at 8.
61 Id. at 1.
62 Id. at 5–6.
63 Id. at 7.
64 Id. at 2.
65 Id. at 4.
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lose confidential protection, even though they would likely retain their
privileged character if sent through traditional mail.66
II. THE SELECTIVE WAIVER DOCTRINE AND TRULINCS
COMMUNICATIONS
Generally, the attorney-client privilege is waived when clients or
attorneys in their capacity as agents for their clients voluntarily disclose
otherwise privileged communications to third parties.67  Voluntary dis-
closures are inconsistent with the assertion of privilege, because clients
or their attorneys have not treated their communications as if they de-
served to be privileged.68  Accordingly, most courts of appeal to consider
the issue have held that clients may not “selectively waive” the attorney-
client privilege.69  For example, corporations under investigation by fed-
eral agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
cannot reveal otherwise privileged communications to these agencies and
assert the privilege against other litigants with claims against the
corporation.70
When defendants raise selective waiver, they wish to waive the
privilege as to some communications so they can gain a benefit from one
party while invoking the privilege against other parties.71  If successfully
raised in securities litigation, a corporate defendant gains the benefit of
leniency from federal agencies by waiving the privilege for certain com-
munications while protecting itself from litigious private parties.72  As-
suming arguendo that federal prisoners voluntarily waive the attorney-
client privilege when they exchange emails with their attorneys via TRU-
LINCS, then the doctrine of selective waiver has some appeal, because it
would allow prisoners to gain the benefits of the TRULINCS system
66 See id. at 2–3.
67 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423–24
(3d Cir. 1991).
68 See id.
69 See In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing In re Qwest
Communications Int’l, 450 F.3d 1179, 1197 (10th Cir. 2006); Burden-Meeks v. Welch, 319
F.3d 897, 899 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.,
293 F.3d 289, 295 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 686
(1st Cir. 1997); Genentech, Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1416–18
(Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993); Westinghouse,
951 F.2d at 1425; In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623–24 (4th Cir. 1988); Permian
Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also In re Columbia, 293
F.3d at 302–03 (discussing selective waiver).
70 See In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 302–05.
71 See id. at 298–99 (describing the operation of the selective waiver doctrine); Diversi-
fied Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977) (arguing that encouraging
corporations to comply with government investigations supports applying the selective privi-
lege doctrine).
72 See Diversified, 572 F.2d at 611.
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without truly sacrificing attorney-client privilege.73  Prisoners could ar-
gue that they are voluntarily waiving the privilege as to the BOP to gain
the benefit of confidential communication, but invoking the privilege
against federal prosecutors—the “private party” in this situation.74
A. Selective Waiver Doctrine and TRULINCS
1. Rationales Against Selective Waiver
Courts offer several rationales for rejecting the selective waiver
doctrine in the securities litigation context.  First, voluntary disclosure of
privileged communications to third parties is inconsistent with the pur-
pose of the attorney-client privilege.75  As discussed above, the attorney-
client privilege seeks to ensure that clients share all information with
their attorneys, thus enabling attorneys to render effective counsel to
their clients.  By disclosing confidential communications to government
investigators, a client has decided that the benefit of the privilege is out-
weighed by the benefit of cooperation with investigators.76  Yet, “[t]he
privilege depends on the assumption that full and frank communication
will be fostered by the assurance of confidentiality, and the justification
for granting the privilege ‘ceases when the client does not appear to have
been desirous of secrecy.’”77
While a client’s desire to cooperate with government investigations
may be “laudable,”78 the privilege “was never designed to protect con-
versations between a client and the Government—i.e., an adverse
party—rather, it pertains only to conversations between the client and his
or her attorney.”79  That is, the attorney-client privilege is not a trial
tactic to be used against some parties but not others.80  For an illustrative
example, consider Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philip-
pines.81  In that case, the Philippines sought tort damages from Westing-
house for bribing the country’s president in exchange for a power plant.82
During discovery, the Philippines “sought certain documents generated
during an internal investigation conducted by Westinghouse’s outside
73 Cf. id.
74 Cf. id.
75 See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414,
1423–24 (3d Cir. 1991).
76 See Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
77 Id. at 1220 (citation omitted).
78 See id. at 1221.
79 See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 302
(6th Cir. 2002).
80 See Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221 (“The attorney-client privilege is not designed for such
tactical employment.”).
81 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991).
82 See id. at 1417.
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counsel.”83  Previously, Westinghouse had disclosed the documents in
question to the SEC and the Department of Justice (DOJ) during related
investigations by those agencies.84  Westinghouse objected to the Philip-
pines’ discovery requests on attorney-privilege grounds.85  The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals held that Westinghouse could not invoke the
privilege.86  It noted that courts have recognized instances “[w]hen dis-
closure to a third party is necessary for the client to obtain informed legal
advice.”87  For example, “client[s] may disclose communications to co-
defendants or co-litigants without waiving the privilege.”88  However,
the court reasoned that selective waiver is inconsistent with the attorney-
client privilege because the only purpose of selective waiver is to en-
courage communication with the government.89  Hence, the court con-
cluded that application of the selective waiver doctrine would expand the
attorney-client privilege beyond its intended purpose.90
Second, the attorney-client privilege obstructs the truth-finding pro-
cess and is therefore construed narrowly.91  The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reached that conclusion in In re Pacific Pictures Corporation.92
In that case, D.C. Comics (D.C.) sued producer Marc Toberoff.  D.C.
claimed Toberoff “interfered with [D.C.’s] contractual relationships”
with the heirs of the creators of the Superman comic.93  D.C.’s case was
based on a cover letter, prepared by an attorney who worked for Tober-
off, which the attorney had sent to D.C.94  The cover letter detailed
Toberoff’s “alleged master plan to capture Superman for himself.”95
“Rather than exploiting the documents [including the cover letter], D.C.
Comics entrusted them to an outside attorney and sought to obtain them
through ordinary discovery . . . .”96  Toberoff alleged that the attorney
stole the cover letter along with other documents and resisted the discov-
ery request.97  Approximately a month after D.C. filed suit, however,
Toberoff asked the U.S. Attorney’s Office to investigate the attorney’s
83 Id.
84 See id.
85 See id. at 1420.
86 See id. at 1425.
87 See id. at 1424.
88 See id.
89 See id. at 1425 (“Because the selective waiver rule . . . protects disclosures made for
entirely different purposes [than obtaining informed legal advice], it cannot be reconciled with
traditional attorney-client privilege doctrine.”).
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 679 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).
93 See id. at 1124–25.
94 See id.
95 See id. at 1125.
96 See id.
97 See id.
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alleged theft.98  The U.S. Attorney’s Office agreed to assist, on condition
that Toberoff hand over all relevant documents, including the cover let-
ter.99  The U.S. Attorney’s Office promised not to disclose any confiden-
tial documents to third parties.100  Toberoff immediately complied.101
D.C. argued that Toberoff’s compliance waived any remaining privilege
on the disputed documents.102
The Ninth Circuit agreed.103  The court concluded that the privilege
must be construed narrowly, consistent with the limited purpose of the
attorney-client privilege (i.e., full and frank communication) and the
principle that “the public has a right to every man’s evidence.”104  Appli-
cation of the selective waiver doctrine would “unmoor” the attorney-cli-
ent privilege from its traditional purpose while contravening the “every
man’s evidence” rule.105  Although the court noted that it is empowered
by the Federal Rules of Evidence to create new evidentiary privileges, it
also noted that the Supreme Court has urged courts to exercise such
power sparingly.106
Third, an exception to the attorney-client privilege must be sup-
ported by a sufficiently important interest that outweighs the public’s
interest in every man’s evidence.107  Traditionally, that interest is effec-
tive representation fostered through full and frank communication.108  In
cases like Westinghouse and Pacific Pictures, the interest in question—
increasing cooperation with government investigations—was important
but did not outweigh the public’s interest in an unobstructed truth-finding
process.109  Moreover, the courts in those cases noted that even if that
interest did outweigh the public’s interest in every man’s evidence, selec-
tive waiver did not appear to increase cooperation with government in-
vestigations as the court in Diversified suggested it would.110  Hence,
application of selective waiver was unwarranted in those cases.111
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 1126–27.
104 See id. at 1126 (citation omitted).
105 See id. at 1127–28.
106 See id. at 1128.
107 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425–26
(3d Cir. 1991).
108 See id. at 1425 (“The traditional waiver doctrine provides that disclosure to third par-
ties waives the attorney-client privilege unless the disclosure serves the purpose of enabling
clients to obtain informed legal advice.”).
109 See id. at 1425–26; In re Pac. Pictures, 679 F.3d at 1127–28.
110 See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426; In re Pac. Pictures, 679 F.3d at 1127–28.
111 See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426; In re Pac. Pictures, 679 F.3d at 1127–28.
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2. The Factors Weighing Against Selective Waiver Doctrine Do
Not Apply to TRULINCS Communications
As we can see, courts decline to apply selective waiver doctrine in
light of the purpose of the attorney-client privilege: To encourage full
and frank communication between clients and attorneys and thereby en-
sure effective representation for clients.  As discussed above, courts only
privilege communications when doing so serves that purpose and is not
outweighed by countervailing public interests.  “The client cannot be
permitted to pick and choose among his opponents, waiving the privilege
for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to obstruct others,
or to invoke the privilege as to communications whose confidentiality he
has already compromised for his own benefit.”112
For example, clients’ cooperating with government investigations is
presumably an attempt to bring the clients in line with laws they were
supposed to follow in the first place.  However, as one court noted, selec-
tive waiver does not distinguish between private litigants and public
ones.113  A corporate client could invoke selective waiver against one
government agency while disclosing confidential information to an-
other.114  As a result, selective waiver could lead to an anomalous result,
in which the regulations of one agency take priority over the regulations
of another.115  Hence, courts are loath to encourage cooperation by grant-
ing entities a privilege for complying with pre-existing legal duties.
Such entities cannot have their cake and eat it, too, so to speak.
Although the doctrine of selective waiver has been decried by most
courts of appeal as inconsistent with the underlying rationales of the at-
torney-client privilege, the federal courts’ distaste for the doctrine may
be fact specific.116  For example, corporate securities defendants are usu-
ally sophisticated litigants with robust legal teams protecting their inter-
ests.117  As sophisticated litigants, corporate defendants are already well
equipped to protect themselves from adverse parties without courts
granting them the added benefit of selective waiver.  As discussed above,
corporate defendants could use selective waiver as a shield against fed-
eral investigation and a sword against other litigants with claims against
the corporation.118  Such a use of the attorney-client privilege has little if
112 Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
113 See id. at 1221–22.
114 See id.
115 See id. at 1222.
116 See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289,
302–05 (6th Cir. 2002).
117 See In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 2012).
118 See In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 302–03.
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anything to do with encouraging full and frank communication between
corporate defendants and their counsel.119
Indeed, no such privilege was established at the time
Westinghouse decided to cooperate with the SEC and
the DOJ.  When Westinghouse first disclosed privileged
materials to the SEC, only one court of appeals had
adopted the selective waiver rule.  By the time Westing-
house made its disclosures to the DOJ, another court of
appeals had trenchantly rejected the selective waiver
rule.  [The court found] it significant that Westinghouse
chose to cooperate despite the absence of an established
privileged protecting disclosures to government agen-
cies.  [The court also noted] that many other corpora-
tions also have chosen to cooperate with the SEC despite
the lack of an established privilege protecting their
disclosures.120
Hence, there is no reason to believe that a corporate defendant will be
more forthcoming with its counsel if selective waiver is an option.
Additionally, federal agencies—despite courts’ near universal rejec-
tion of the selective waiver doctrine in the corporate context—frequently
sign confidentiality agreements, in which they agree to keep confidential
the communications revealed by corporate defendants.121  Even if courts
did not honor those agreements, cloaking voluntary disclosures in the
attorney-client privilege would effectively aid federal agencies in obfus-
cating the fact-finding process in related litigation by private parties.122
Hence, the selective waiver doctrine, as applied in the securities context,
acts counter to the effective administration of justice and does little to
enhance the goals of the attorney-client privilege.123
However, the application of the selective waiver doctrine may not
always be inconsistent with the rationales underlying the attorney-client
privilege.  Federal inmates do not have the same resources as corporate
defendants.  From 2009 to 2010, the average length of a federal sentence
imposed on a convicted offender was 54 months.124  Among convicted
119 See id. at 302.
120 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1426 (3d Cir.
1991).
121 See In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 303.
122 See id. (“The investigatory agencies of the Government should act to bring to light
illegal activities, not to assist wrongdoers in concealing the information from the public
domain.”).
123 See id. at 302–03.
124 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
2010—STATISTICAL TABLES 22 tbl.5.2 (2013).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-1\CJP106.txt unknown Seq: 15 16-DEC-15 11:22
2015] PROTECTING ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS 283
offenders, over half were under the age of forty.125  Most convicted of-
fenders were Black/African American or Hispanic/Latino.126  Among
convicted African Americans, 82.5% were sentenced to incarceration;
among convicted Hispanics, 83.6% were sentenced to incarceration.127
Although exact figures are unavailable from the BOP, the latest data
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) indicates that half of African
American and Hispanic persons over sixteen years old make less than
$638 per week.128  Of course, that statistic assumes employment; the un-
employment rate is currently 10.9% for African Americans and 6.8% for
Hispanics.129  Unsurprisingly then, public defenders “represent 60 per-
cent of all criminal defendants in the federal court system.”130  In 2012,
the median salary of a public defender with 11–15 years of experience
was $78,600.131  Hence, it is safe to assume that many federal prisoners
do not have robust legal teams working their defense.
To demonstrate that the selective waiver doctrine could serve the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege, consider an example based on
the statistics just discussed.132  Suppose Defendant (D) is charged with a
federal crime.  D is incarcerated in a federal prison and is awaiting trial.
Since D is unable to afford counsel, the court appoints a federal public
defender (the FPD) to represent him.  Preparation for D’s trial involves
reviewing hundreds of documents related to D’s charges.  Assume that
the FPD must have extensive conversations with D to understand the
documents.  Assume further that these conversations involve confidential
communications, particularly relating to D’s trial strategy.  Moreover, as-
sume that the FPD and D frequently communicate via TRULINCS and
that the BOP wishes to monitor these communications in the interest of
prison security.
125 See id. at 20 tbl.4.4.
126 See id.
127 See id. at 23 tbl.5.3.
128 Earnings by Demographics, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/
cps/earnings.htm#demographics (last visited Nov. 19, 2015) (click “Most requested series”
hyperlink; then select “Median wkly earnings . . . Black or African Amer” and Median wkly
earnings . . . Hispanic or Latino” and click “Retrieve Data” hyperlink).
129 Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/data/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2015) (click “Unemployment” hyperlink; then
click “Top Picks” under “Labor Force Statistics” heading; then select “Unemployment Rate—
Black or African American” and “Unemployment Rate—Hispanic or Latino” and click “Re-
trieve Data” hyperlink).
130 Ron Nixon, Public Defenders Are Tightening Belts Because of Steep Federal Budget
Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/us/public-defenders-
are-tightening-belts-because-of-steep-federal-budget-cuts.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
131 Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, New Public Interest and Public Sector
Salary Figures from NALP Show Little Growth Since 2004 (Oct. 18, 2012), http://
www.nalp.org/2012_pubint_salaries.
132 Notably, I have not found any cases in which a defendant raises selective waiver to
protect communications sent via TRULINCS.
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As we have already discussed, prisoners have several means of priv-
ileged communication, including special mail, unmonitored phone calls,
and in-person visits.  Assume for the sake of this hypothetical that un-
monitored phone calls are simply unfeasible.  D and the FPD have made
several requests for unmonitored phone calls, but none of them have
been acknowledged.  Assume further that the average time for the FPD
and D to exchange mail is one week, whereas exchanges through TRU-
LINCS are nearly instantaneous.  Moreover, D can access the TRU-
LINCS system at least once a day to review documents and respond to
the FPD.  Hence, in-person and TRULINCS are the FPD and D’s most
expedient methods of communication.
Suppose D wishes to take her case to trial.  The “[m]edian days
from felony case filing to case termination” between 1994 and 2010 was
454 days or about 1.25 years.133  In a national survey of public defend-
ers, a majority of respondents indicated that it would take three to four
hours “for an attorney in [their] main office to leave the office, travel to
the [incarceration] facility, have the client brought to a meeting room,
conduct a one hour interview, and then return to the office” during a
“typical weekday visit.”134  Assuming that a visit to D would take the
FPD four hours, including one hour of one-on-one time, that visitation at
the prison is limited to typical business hours (e.g., 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday), and that the time from filing to trial was fifty-
two weeks, the FPD could spend a maximum of 520 hours with her
client.
However, one would be hard-pressed to find a public defender who
could meet with his or her client twice a day, Monday through Friday,
for the extent of his or her client’s stay in prison.  Indeed, one would be
hard-pressed to find a public defender with just one client!135
For example, [at a public hearing held by the American
Bar Association] a [public defender] from Pennsylvania
told of a county that had had 4172 cases in 1980 but that
the number of cases had grown to 8000 in 2000 without
any growth in the staff size of the public defender’s of-
fice.  Especially interesting was the testimony of the
Public Defender for the State of Rhode Island, who de-
tailed the caseload problems of his agency. . . . Each
lawyer was handling, on average, 1517 misdemeanor
133 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS,
2010, at 20 fig.11 (2013).
134 NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., RAND CORP., CASE WEIGHTS FOR FEDERAL DEFENDER
ORGANIZATIONS 236 (2011).
135 NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC
DEFENSE 12–13 (2011) (discussing national studies of the caseloads of public defenders).
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cases and 239 felonies, or a total of 1756 cases each
year.  The dimension of the caseload problem is stagger-
ing when compared with the testimony of the chief de-
fender from another jurisdiction . . . in which each
lawyer had an average annual caseload of 311 felonies,
misdemeanors, and other matters.  If . . . [an] analysis of
1850 available hours in a year is applied to public de-
fenders in Rhode Island, each attorney would have, on
average, one hour and five minutes to devote to each of
his or her cases—to meet with clients, interview wit-
nesses, prepare bail and pretrial motions, appear in court,
and so on.  Often, therefore, there is only time to “meet
and plead” clients guilty.136
Consider this scenario in light of the three requirements for creating a
new privilege raised in Part II.A.1.  First, application of the privilege
must encourage full and frank communication between D and the FPD.
Second, application of the privilege cannot obstruct the truth-finding pro-
cess beyond the scope envisioned by privilege doctrine.  Third, applica-
tion of the privilege must be supported by a sufficiently important
interest.
a) Application of the Privilege in This Case Would
Encourage Full and Frank Communication Between D
and the FPD
If the federal prosecutors handling D’s case could read TRULINCS
emails sent between D and the FPD, then the prosecutors could learn
valuable information about D’s trial strategy.  Obviously, D and the FPD
would want to keep their trial strategy confidential.  Hence, D and the
FPD would communicate less through TRULINCS and rely on other
means of communication to prevent the prosecutors from learning this
valuable information.  Under the facts of our hypothetical, those other
means are either unavailable or ineffective.  Similarly, the FPD simply
does not have the time to sit with D in-person to review all of the docu-
ments relating to his case.  As such, the overall level of communication
between D and the FPD will decrease, unless D can assert the attorney-
client privilege to protect the TRULINCS communications.  By asserting
selective waiver, D could prevent the prosecutors from learning the valu-
able confidential information contained in those communications but still
allow prison administrators to review D’s emails to ensure the safety and
security of the prison.
136 See id. at 17–18 (footnotes omitted).
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There is little risk of D “gaming” the system by invoking selective
waiver in this context.  D is not voluntarily waiving the privilege to co-
operate with a government investigation and obtain the benefit of leni-
ency; rather, he is seeking to protect confidential communications and
thereby ensure effective representation at trial.137  The only voluntary
waiver D makes is with respect to the BOP, which wants to read D’s
emails to ensure prison security.  The federal prosecutors in this example
will not “go easier” on D if he allows them to read his TRULINCS
emails.  In fact, the federal prosecutors will have a stronger case if they
are allowed to do so.  As such, D does not obtain a special advantage by
invoking selective waiver.138  The benefit D receives—the protection of
attorney-client communications—is available to him through special
mail, unmonitored phone calls, and in-person communications.  Hence,
the only benefit D receives is the exact benefit the attorney-client privi-
lege seeks to protect: Robust communication between attorney and cli-
ent, which fosters effective representation.
Although one might argue that the availability of alternative means
of communication diminishes the need to protect TRULINCS emails, the
attorney-client privilege is not circumscribed by the availability of alter-
native forms of communication.139  Necessity plays a role in application
of the privilege, insofar as it protects communications that would not
have been made without the privilege.140  Nevertheless, application of
the privilege is not a function of absolute necessity.141  Presumably, cli-
ents would be hesitant to use any form of communication if clients were
required first to show that a particular form of communication was abso-
lutely necessary before the privilege attached.
b) Application of the Privilege Will Not Obstruct the Fact-
Finding Process Beyond the Scope Envisioned by the
Privilege Doctrine
Recall that the attorney-client privilege strikes a balance between
the need for the effective administration of justice and the need for effec-
137 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d
Cir. 1991) (“When disclosure to a third party is necessary for the client to obtain informed
legal advice, courts have recognized exceptions to the rule that disclosure waives the attorney-
client privilege.”).
138 Cf. id. at 1425.
139 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (“A communication can be in any form.  Most confidential client communications
to a lawyer are written or spoken words, but the privilege applies to communication through
technologically enhanced methods such as telephone and telegraph, audio or video tape re-
cording, film, telecopier, and other electronic means.”).
140 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
141 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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tive legal representation.142  The attorney-client privilege is meant to ob-
struct the truth-finding process to strike that balance.143  As the Supreme
Court put it, “[S]ince the privilege has the effect of withholding relevant
information from the fact-finder, it applies only where necessary to
achieve its purpose.  Accordingly it protects only those disclosures—
necessary to obtain informed legal advice—which might not have been
made absent the privilege.”144  In the above hypothetical, D will not
make necessary communications to his lawyer if the TRULINCS com-
munications are not privileged.  Although he may still communicate with
the FPD through other means, the importance of document review makes
frequent communication necessary under the facts of the hypothetical
and renders the other means of communication insufficient for D’s
representation.
c) Application of Selective Waiver is Supported by D’s
Interest in Effective Representation
If the privilege does not protect D’s TRULINCS communications,
then the FPD will be forced to schedule inefficient in-person visits to
review documents with D.  As discussed, the FPD will have a limited
amount of time to visit with D (and in a worst case scenario, the FPD
could have almost 1,800 cases, including D’s case).145  Consider the ca-
lamity this could spell for D’s case if it looked anything like Dr. Ah-
med’s case, which was discussed in the Introduction.  In that case, there
were “50,000 pages of documents” to review.146  If D’s case involved
50,000 pages of documents, and the FPD could spend a maximum of 520
hours of one-on-one time with D,147 then D and the FPD could review
about 106 pages per hour at most.  This is a rosy and unrealistic scenario.
In reality, the FPD will have exponentially less than 520 hours to spend
with D.148
Presumably, then, the FPD will have to triage documents to ensure
that the most important elements of the case are covered with her client.
Arguably, key documents will go unreviewed and key pieces of legal
advice will never be offered because of the time limitations.  In turn, D’s
trial strategy will suffer.  In that case, D and his attorney will be in the
exact situation the Court identified as the heart of the privilege: “disclo-
142 See supra text accompanying note 38. R
143 See 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 327 (2004).
144 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403.
145 See LEFSTEIN, supra note 135 and accompanying text. R
146 See Clifford, supra note 1. R
147 See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
148 See LEFSTEIN, supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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sures—necessary to obtain informed legal advice—which might not
have been made absent the privilege.”149
B. Federal Prosecutors Cannot Overcome the Privilege by Asserting
Administrative Burden
Now, one might argue that application of selective waiver would
effectively block prosecutors from obtaining valuable evidence even
when they are entitled to it.  This is a real concern.
The law of waiver . . . protects law enforcement
from unfair, one-sided assertions of privilege by the sub-
jects of law enforcement investigations and legal pro-
ceedings.  This protection . . . is sufficient to guard
against abuses of the privilege and assertions of privilege
that do not further the administration of justice.150
Accordingly, certain exceptions to the privilege protect federal prosecu-
tors from abuses, such as the crime-fraud exception.151  Suppose that D
contacted the FPD via TRULINCS and said that he wished to hide cer-
tain evidence from the federal prosecutors.  The FPD agrees and the evi-
dence is hidden.  In this case, the crime-fraud exception would apply and
the federal prosecutors could compel the disclosure of the TRULINCS
communications in question.152  Thus, selective waiver would not act as
an absolute bar to discovering attorney-client communications over
TRULINCS.
However, federal prosecutors cannot vitiate the attorney-client priv-
ilege through the assertion of administrative burden or mere unfairness;
no jurisdiction has accepted these grounds as sufficient to overcome the
privilege.153  In cases such as Dr. Ahmed’s,154 the federal prosecutors
seemed to confuse the attorney-client privilege with the work-product
doctrine, which protects “papers prepared by or on behalf of attorneys in
anticipation of litigation.”155  Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the
work-product doctrine can be overcome with a showing that the “sub-
149 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403.
150 Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement’s Multi-Front As-
sault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 510
(2003) (footnote omitted).
151 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 79, 82 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
152 See id. § 82(a).
153 See id. § 77 cmt. d (“The law recognizes no exception to the rule of this Section.  Set
out below are considerations that may support such an exception, although no court or legisla-
ture has adopted it.”).
154 See supra Introduction.
155 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1427–28
(3d Cir. 1991).
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stantial equivalent” of the materials cannot be obtained “without undue
hardship.”156  Hence, there may be cases in which prosecutors could ob-
tain communications sent via TRULINCS if a court decided the commu-
nications were attorney work product and the undue hardship standard
was satisfied.
Because the attorney-client privilege cannot, as a matter of law, be
overcome through the assertion of administrative burden, a cost-benefit
analysis of the burdens alleged by prosecutors in cases such as Dr. Ah-
med’s is outside the scope of this Note.  Even if administrative burden
could overcome the privilege, it is worth noting that TRULINCS “is
funded entirely by the Inmate Trust Fund, which is maintained by profits
from inmate purchases of commissary products and telephone services,
and the fees inmates . . . pay for using TRULINCS.”157  Given that, the
weight of federal prosecutors’ administrative burden is unclear.  In Dr.
Ahmed’s case, prosecutors argued that emails between clients and their
attorneys, and emails between clients and third parties, cannot be sorted
electronically.158  As such, a privilege team must sort privileged emails
from non-privileged emails before they are given to the prosecutors.159
Because of budget cuts, the prosecutors could no longer afford to sort the
emails.160  However, since inmates pay for the cost of TRULINCS (or at
least some of the cost), then presumably the cost of creating an electronic
sorting program would (or could) be placed on the inmates.  Hence, the
administrative burden on prosecutors should decrease.  Even if the cost
of an electronic sorting system was placed on federal prosecutors, it
seems improbable that the programs required to filter emails would be
costly, considering that the programs are available for free to the public
through popular email services such as Google’s Gmail.161
What seems more certain is that protecting TRULINCS emails with
the attorney-client privilege will decrease the BOP’s administrative
costs.  Although it is hard to say without exact data, the BOP’s adminis-
trative costs should go down as more prisoners use email instead of tradi-
tional post to speak with their attorneys.  Heavier reliance on email
would mean less need to task prison officers with sorting through tradi-
tional mail.  An automated program could sort electronic mail from attor-
neys.  Search algorithms could automatically search non-attorney-client
emails for suspicious language.  In short, there is no obvious reason why
156 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii).
157 See BOP GUIDE, supra note 42, at 32. R
158 See supra Introduction.
159 See supra Introduction.
160 See supra Introduction.
161 See Using Filters, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/mail/answer/6579?hl=EN (last
visited Jan. 14, 2015).
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the BOP could not serve the needs of its prisoners while ensuring prison
safety for its personnel when the tools are available for free to the public.
CONCLUSION
From a practical standpoint, two questions are worth considering
before concluding this Note.  First, what kind of documentation would a
defendant need to viably raise selective waiver?  We have already dis-
cussed the legal argument, but again, attorney-client privilege and selec-
tive waiver are fact-specific arguments.  Hence, to viably raise selective
waiver, a defendant would need to paint a picture for the court.162
I speculate that this picture would include detailed time logs of in-
person prison visits between a defendant and her attorney, accounts of
the kind of evidence at the heart of a defendant’s case (e.g., medical
records), and the availability of other forms of communication.  A defen-
dant would summon this evidence to show that other forms of communi-
cation (e.g., telephone, in-person visits) are practically unavailable;
hence, by protecting TRULINCS communications with the attorney-cli-
ent privilege, the court can encourage full and frank communication be-
tween a defendant and her attorney.163  Of course, a lack of alternate
forms of communication in and of itself is not enough to warrant applica-
tion of the privilege (in the same way federal prosecutors cannot over-
come the privilege by asserting administrative burden).164  Rather, a lack
of alternative forms of communication indicates that protecting TRU-
LINCS communications with the privilege would increase full and frank
communication between a defendant and her attorney.165
Second, is selective waiver the best legal argument to protect TRU-
LINCS communications?  A limited number of cases are available re-
garding TRULINCS communications, and no case directly addresses the
application of selective waiver in that context.  However, the defendant
in United States v. Walia argued that a federal prosecutor’s reading of his
TRULINCS communications violated his Sixth Amendment right to ef-
fective counsel.166  According to the Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington, “Government violates the right to effective assistance when
it interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make indepen-
dent decisions about how to conduct the defense.”167
162 See supra Introduction.
163 See supra Part II.A.2.
164 See supra Part II.B.
165 See supra Part II.A.2.
166 No. 14-CR-213 (MKB), 2014 WL 3734522, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014).
167 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
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Although the court in Walia rejected the defendant’s argument be-
cause he had alternative forms of communication,168 one might argue
that ineffective assistance of counsel is better suited to the facts intro-
duced in Part II.A.2.  In my opinion, it is not clear that one argument is
better than the other because they are both fact specific.  However, I
believe selective wavier has a slight edge because the availability of al-
ternative forms of communication cuts heavily against the argument of
ineffective assistance of counsel.  In any case, a defendant would be well
advised to raise all arguments to protect TRULINCS communications.
Ultimately, the purpose of this Note was not to show that the selec-
tive waiver doctrine serves the purpose of the attorney-client privilege in
all cases.  We have already discussed that the application of the attorney-
client privilege is fact specific, so the privilege will not attach in all
cases.  There may be a scenario in which D shares attorney-client com-
munications with a federal agency such as the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) to cut a deal on tax evasion charges.  In that case, the federal pros-
ecutors overseeing D’s criminal case could successfully obtain all attor-
ney-client communications relating to the subject matter of the
communications revealed to the IRS.  If D attempted to raise selective
waiver, he would face the same problem as the defendants in Westing-
house and Pacific Pictures—that is, waiver of privilege does nothing to
encourage full and frank communication between D and his attorney.
However, as we have seen, selective waiver could serve the purpose of
the attorney-client privilege in certain circumstances.169
168 Walia, 2014 WL 3734522, at *16.
169 See supra Part II.A.2.
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